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Engaging Pakistan 
Wh at  i s  t h e  p r o b l e m ? 
Pakistan is a critical player in international efforts to counter global and 
regional terrorist groups and stabilise the situation in Afghanistan.  But the 
West’s increasingly difficult relationship with Pakistan is damaging its 
ability to work effectively with Islamabad to achieve critical objectives in 
Afghanistan and in the fight against terrorism more broadly. 
One element in this problematic relationship has been a growing mutual 
suspicion and animosity.  In particular, many members of the Pakistani elite 
believe that the West has unrealistic expectations of what Pakistan can do 
vis-à-vis Afghanistan and in the fight against terrorism, and that the West 
does not take Pakistani views or interests into account. Such perceptions will 
intensify in the aftermath of the November Mumbai terrorist attack making 
counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan even more difficult. 
Wh at  s h ou l d  b e  d o n e ? 
The West needs to build a new, broader and more sustainable engagement 
with Pakistan. One key element would be to expand the bases for the West’s 
engagement with Pakistan beyond its historical focus on senior figures in 
Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. 
A small but useful step in this process would be for Australia to launch a 
second-track dialogue engaging more diverse elements in Pakistani society, 
including civilian political representatives, academics, businesspeople, civil 
society and the media. 
Such exchanges would complement and feed into the existing official contacts 
and assist the development of policy in areas critical to Australia, Pakistan 
and the international community. It would also contribute to the broader 
effort that is needed to break down mutual suspicion and misunderstanding 
between Pakistan and the West. 
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The late November terror attacks in Mumbai 
have once again thrown the spotlight onto 
Pakistan.  The country had already been 
struggling with growing international pressure 
over the safe haven and support that the 
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and 
international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda 
were obtaining in Pakistan’s troubled Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North 
West Frontier Province.  Claims that the 
Mumbai attacks were carried out by Pakistani 
nationals, perhaps linked to the terrorist group 
Lashkar–e-Taiba (LeT), will place even more 
pressure on Islamabad. 
The West’s options for forcing nuclear-armed 
Pakistan to be more responsive to international 
demands on these issues, however, are limited. 
The West will rightly demand a greater effort 
by Pakistan to eradicate groups like the LeT as 
well as to weed out those elements within its 
intelligence services that lend support to them. 
Yet it will also need to protect a civilian 
government that is still in its infancy and is 
faced with multiple crises, from terrorism to a 
rapidly failing economy. 
Against this background the goal of this policy 
brief is not to suggest any silver bullet solution 
to this challenge, but rather to make a more 
modest suggestion about a small contribution 
Australia could make toward building a more 
durable and productive relationship with 
Pakistan.  Attacks like those in Mumbai will 
necessarily focus attention on Pakistan’s 
military and intelligence elite.  But as this policy 
brief will argue, once the dust settles, a broader 
engagement with Pakistani society will also be 
needed. 
For too long the West’s relationship with 
Pakistan has been defined by a focus on 
Pakistan’s strongest state institution – the army – 
largely to the exclusion of other sections of 
society. But the kinds of actions that Pakistani 
authorities need to undertake to fight terrorism 
and extremism over the longer term require 
broad support from Pakistani society, more so 
since the election of a civilian government in 
2008.  Today, many segments of Pakistani 
opinion – including ones normally well disposed 
to the West – believe that the West has 
unrealistic expectations of what Pakistan can do 
vis-à-vis Afghanistan and in the fight against 
terrorism and that it does not take Pakistani 
views or interests into account. In the wake of 
the Mumbai attacks it will be doubly important 
to ensure that these segments of Pakistani 
opinion do not feel even more isolated from and 
resentful toward the outside world. 
The Australian Government has been looking 
at ways to enhance bilateral ties with Pakistan, 
an aim, driven for the most part by counter- 
terrorism and Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the 
focus has largely been on increasing military 
and intelligence connections and support. 
While focusing on counter-terrorism measures 
may help Pakistan deal with Islamic extremists 
and insurgents in the short term, it will, 
nevertheless, be essential for Australia to 
broaden its engagement with the Pakistani elite 
and non-officials if it wishes to develop a more 
fruitful and sustainable relationship in the long 
term. Put differently, unless Pakistani 
perspectives and concerns are heard and 
understood, bilateral relations will remain 
weak and shallow. In broadening its 
engagement with Pakistan, Australia might also 
help improve the West’s stumbling relations 
with this critical country.
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Pakistan – why it matters 
With some 165 million people, Pakistan is the 
sixth most populous country in the world. By 
2050 it is estimated that it will have over 300 
million inhabitants, making it the biggest 
Muslim nation (ahead of Indonesia) and the 
fourth most populous country in the world 
after India, China and the United States. 1 
So in size alone Pakistan is a country whose 
voice needs to be heard. But there are four geo- 
political reasons why Pakistan is critically 
important to the world. 
First, and most obviously, Pakistan has a 
pivotal role to play in the ‘War on Terror’. 
Today al-Qaeda operatives continue to reside 
in western Pakistan’s tribal areas. While 
Pakistan has captured several high-value 
al-Qaeda operatives in the last seven years, 
many are still on the loose, including Osama 
Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayyman al- 
Zawahiri. Pakistan also remains a major 
training ground for terrorists conducting 
operations overseas. The majority of the 
terrorists involved in the London bombing of 7 
July 2005 and the attempted attack two weeks 
later had been trained in Pakistan. 
Second, Pakistan’s location next to Afghanistan 
and historical involvement in that country 
make it a critical player in efforts to stabilise 
the country and to ensure that it does not 
return to being an operating base for 
extremists. In particular, the Taliban’s safe 
havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas have made it 
possible for these armed groups to sustain their 
insurgency against US and NATO-led forces. 
Until these safe havens are eradicated 
permanently, Coalition forces will be hard- 
pressed to stabilise Afghanistan. 2 
But even without the ‘War on Terror’ and the 
war in Afghanistan, Pakistan would be 
important given its strategic location and its 
possession of nuclear weapons.  Pakistan is 
strategically located at the crossroads of South 
Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, making 
it a pivotal player in a region with significant 
economic potential, particularly in the 
exploitation and transportation of oil and gas 
from central Asia and Iran to India and 
beyond. Unfortunately, it is also located in a 
region which has two unresolved conflicts – 
Kashmir and Afghanistan – and has a direct 
stake in the outcome of both. In the case of 
Kashmir – which has been a fraught issue 
between India and Pakistan for over 60 years – 
Pakistan is directly involved, having gone to 
war with India over this Muslim-majority 
disputed territory in 1948, 1965 and 1999. 
And while there have been bilateral discussions 
since 2002, no one expects an early 
breakthrough. 
Third, Pakistan, like India, has been a member 
of the nuclear club since 1998, when they both 
detonated nuclear devices. Neither Pakistan 
nor India is signatory to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), nor is there any indication that 
they will join. Compounding the 
nuclearisation of South Asia is the 
development by both Pakistan and India of 
missiles able to deliver nuclear warheads over 
a distance of well over 1,000 kilometres. 
China and North Korea heavily assisted 
Pakistan in the development of some of its 
missiles. In return, Dr A.Q. Khan, ‘father of 
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb’, passed on nuclear 
weapons know-how to Pyongyang. While Dr
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A. Q. Khan has acknowledged that through 
his network he also shared Pakistan’s 
knowledge of nuclear-weapons with Iran and 
Libya, the full extent of his proliferation 
activities remains unclear. 
Pakistan’s difficult relations with the West 
Since independence in 1947, relations between 
Pakistan and the West have never been warm. 
Probably the single most important factor has been 
the fact that Pakistan and the West, principally the 
United States, entered into the bilateral relationship 
for different reasons: Pakistan joined US-led 
alliances –the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) - as an insurance policy in 
its confrontation with India. Meanwhile, the 
United States saw Pakistan as yet another sentry 
post in its Cold War containment of the Soviet 
Union. Not surprisingly, therefore, these differing 
motivations often begat mutual disappointment. 
During the brief 1962 Indo-Chinese border 
war, the US administration provided weapons 
to India without first consulting Pakistan, as it 
had previously agreed.  Similarly, during the 
1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the US stopped all 
shipments of military aid to both countries. 
This hurt Pakistan much more than India, as 
the former was wholly dependent on the United 
States for weapons supplies. In 1971, when 
India and Pakistan once again fought, this time 
mainly in East Pakistan, the United States did 
send an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal. 
But this was in reaction to India’s decision to 
sign a Friendship Treaty with the USSR. In any 
case, it did not deter India from dismembering 
Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. 
For the next few years, relations with the West 
went into a freeze, especially under the left- 
leaning government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. 
However, when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan 
became a critical player in Washington’s 
global game. Ignoring the fact that yet again 
another general (Zia-ul-Haq) had taken over 
the reins of power and had executed the 
elected prime minister (Bhutto) on dubious 
charges, the US decided that Pakistan had an 
important ‘frontline’ role to play in helping 
the West counter the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan and stopping them from 
potentially obtaining a warm-water port on 
the Indian ocean. Billions of dollars worth of 
military and economic aid poured in, and 
Afghan and Muslim mujahideen were armed 
and supported by the West and the Arab Gulf 
states. But when the Soviets left Afghanistan 
in 1989, Pakistan was once again forgotten, 
with relations hitting rock bottom following 
Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998. 
Relations were more or less revived in the wake 
of al-Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. Pakistan once 
again became a ‘frontline’ state, with 
Washington providing Pakistan with over 
US$10 billion worth of economic and military 
aid and granting it major non-NATO ally 
status. And yet, instead of being a bulwark 
against jihadists, Pakistan has become the soft 
underbelly of the West’s fight against terrorism. 
On the one hand the Pakistan state, led until 
recently by former Army Chief of Staff General 
Musharraf, has been assisting the US-led 
coalition fight the terrorists, including losing 
over 1000 military personnel in the process. On 
the other hand, elements of its powerful Inter- 
Services Intelligence have been providing back-
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channel support to the Taliban and other 
Afghan groups hiding in Pakistan. 3 
This tension between Pakistan and the West is 
compounded by the reality that Islamabad’s 
regional interests do not sit comfortably with 
those of the West. The cornerstone of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy has been how it can 
most effectively counter New Delhi’s power, 
and since 2001 Afghanistan has increased in 
importance in this 60-year old confrontation. 
Pakistan has always seen Afghanistan as 
providing it with the vital ‘strategic depth’ it 
needs in this confrontation. But with India’s 
substantial involvement in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, Islamabad is increasingly feeling 
encircled by its arch-enemy. 
Given Islamabad’s regional interests, 
Washington’s decision to upgrade its 
relationship with India, including signing a US- 
India nuclear deal in 2006, compounded an 
already difficult Pakistani relationship with the 
United States. The Bush administration has also 
publicly declared that it wants to help India 
become a ‘world power’. 4 Having officially 
ended its support for the Taliban after 9/11 and 
joined the ‘War on Terror’ at great political 
cost at home, Pakistan feels (once again) 
betrayed by Washington. Its perception is that 
the United States sides with Pakistan only when 
it suits it; otherwise it supports New Delhi. 
Australian engagement 
The instrumentalist and ad hoc nature of the 
West’s relations with Pakistan has made 
Pakistanis wary of the West’s intentions 
towards them and suspicious of the sincerity of 
its long-term commitment to that country’s 
stability and development. This apprehension 
has in turn made it difficult to tackle some of 
the most pressing problems of vital interest to 
the West, notably the war in Afghanistan and 
terrorism. There are no shortcuts to building a 
more durable relationship, but one initial, 
useful and relatively low-cost step would be an 
effort to engage broadly with key elements of 
Pakistani society through a second-track 
dialogue – and it is here that Australia could 
play a role. 
Currently, the Australian Government is keen 
to expand bilateral relations with Pakistan, 
largely as a function of security concerns 
already mentioned. Australia’s total aid to 
Pakistan for 2008-09 will be slightly over A$30 
million, an increase of 20 per cent on the 
previous year. Australia has also offered to 
provide counter-insurgency training: in a recent 
trip to Pakistan, the Chief of the Defence Force, 
Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, invited 
Pakistan to observe counter-insurgency training 
run by the Australian Special Command. 
This increased Australian Government 
investment should be complemented by broader 
non-official engagement with sections of 
Pakistani society beyond the West’s traditional 
interlocutors. Indeed, given that Australia comes 
to the Pakistan relationship with relatively little 
political baggage or perceived agenda, it may be 
better placed than others to seek a greater 
engagement with Pakistan. Conducted under the 
Chatham House rule, an annual one or two-day 
meeting would provide an opportunity to have a 
frank discussion of common concerns. More 
importantly, such a dialogue would be a useful 
vehicle for gaining insights into a much broader 
range of Pakistani opinion.
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Participants from the Pakistani side would 
include representatives of think tanks, academic 
institutions, media, business and other civil 
society representatives. Topics would include 
both key strategic issues, such as Afghanistan 
and counter-terrorism, but also other areas 
upon which bilateral cooperation might be 
expanded, including education, the 
environment (water management, agriculture), 
governance and economic development. Indeed, 
given the substantially increased aid funding, a 
broader engagement with civil society to 
discuss those areas that might be best targeted 
for assistance seems even more warranted. 
A bilateral dialogue would also provide an 
important mechanism to feed fresh ideas into 
policy-making circles in both countries. While 
government representatives would be, by 
definition, excluded from a second-track 
dialogue (other than perhaps in a personal 
capacity), there would need to be some 
mechanism to communicate ideas and 
outcomes to officials. This could be done either 
through an outcomes report or attendance by 
government representatives as observers. 
Eventually such a second track process could 
conceivably become a one and a half-track 
process - that is, one in which government 
officials speaking in their private capacity 
would be included in the meeting. 
Annual meetings should alternate between 
Australia and Pakistan. This would also 
provide visiting delegation members with an 
opportunity to meet parliamentarians, 
government officials and academics and 
conduct media interviews. In addition to 
ensuring that participants remained in close 
contact with one another between sessions, 
delegation members would be encouraged to 
draft and circulate discussion papers in 
preparation for the next meeting; to follow up 
recommendations made at the previous 
meeting; to publish the papers delivered at the 
previous meeting; and to interact frequently 
with the media, including publishing articles 
and giving interviews, to ensure good coverage 
of issues of bilateral interest. 
With a new president and an elected civilian 
government in Pakistan, an opportunity exists 
for the Australian Government to expand and 
deepen its bilateral relationship, as it has 
indicated it wishes to do. And as a member of 
the ‘Friends of Pakistan’ – a grouping of major 
donors, Australia has a genuine interest in 
further engaging with Pakistan. The 
establishment of this second-track dialogue 
would be an important building block in 
broadening this relationship, assisting in shaping 
government policy, but also contributing to a 
broader Western effort to put its engagement 
with Pakistan on a sounder footing. 
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